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Abstract
Manifold regularization is a technique that penalizes the complexity of learned
functions over the intrinsic geometry of input data. We develop a connection
to learning functions which are “locally stable”, and propose new regularization
terms for training deep neural networks that are stable against a class of local
perturbations. These regularizers enable us to train a network to state-of-the-
art robust accuracy of 70% on CIFAR-10 against a PGD adversary using `∞
perturbations of size  = 8/255. Furthermore, our techniques do not rely on the
construction of any adversarial examples, thus running orders of magnitude faster
than standard algorithms for adversarial training.
1 Introduction
A hallmark of modern deep learning is the seemingly counterintuitive result that highly overparame-
terized networks trained to zero loss somehow avoid overfitting and perform well on the test set [22].
Despite this ability to generalize, it is also well-established that such models are highly susceptible to
adversarial examples [16], whereby small perturbations to natural images considered imperceptible by
human standards (e.g., slight rotations or tiny changes to pixel intensities) can cause almost complete
degradation of performance. This instability presents a major obstacle for the deployment of deep
learning in safety-critical applications, e.g., autonomous navigation and other physical systems [1, 6].
One of the most effective approaches for learning adversarially robust classifiers is adversarial
training [7, 12, 2], which replaces the training set with adversarially perturbated examples at each
training step. However, the process of generating adversarial perturbations involves an expensive
inner optimization that effectively increases the number of training epochs by a multiplicative factor
(a factor of 5–10 is standard, though early stopping can improve this overhead [18]).
Contributions This work takes a step back from adversarial robustness to consider a closely related
concept: local stability. Our key insight is that we want to learn a function which does not vary much
in small neighborhoods of natural inputs, even if the network classifies incorrectly. We show that this
definition of local stability has a natural interpretation in the context of manifold regularization [3],
and propose an efficient regularizer for batched gradient descent which is independent of the specific
adversarial threat model but still displays surprisingly robust performance.
Our second contribution is a manifold regularization term which exploits the continuous piecewise
linear nature of ReLU networks. The combination of these two regularizers brings us to the state of
the art for robust networks, achieving 70% adversarial and 90% clean accuracy on CIFAR-10 image
classification in 100 epochs. Furthermore, computing these regularizers simply requires evaluating
the network at two additional random points for each training sample, so the total computational cost
is on par with three parallel forward passes through the network. Our techniques thus present a novel,
regularization-only approach to adversarial robustness which is orthogonal to standard adversarial
training and so enjoys better scaling in addition to improved robust and clean accuracy.
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2 Related Work
One of the first examples of adversarial training is the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [7],
which takes a single maximal step along the gradient of the loss function to construct adversarial
perturbations. Subsequent works refine FGSM by taking smaller iterative steps, and the resulting
Project Gradient Descent (PGD) attack [12] is widely considered to be an empirically sound algorithm
for both training and evaluation of robust models. Later improvements to this basic algorithm include
strengthening the adversary or otherwise augmenting the training procedure [4, 20, 23]. Because the
iterative construction of adversaries is computationally expensive, recent works modify PGD to make
it more efficient [15]; in particular, Wong et al. [18] showed that training against an FGSM adversary
with early stopping suffices to achieve state-of-the-art robustness.
Manifold regularization was introduced by Belkin et al. [3] for semi-supervised learning. In this
context, input data is assumed to be supported on a submanifold of the input domain. The goal of
manifold regularization is to leverage the unlabeled samples to learn a function which behaves well
(e.g., is smooth, or has low complexity) on this implicit geometry. The use of manifold regularization
for deep neural networks has been explored in various contexts [21, 17, 10, 24]; in particular, Lee
et al. [11] consider manifold regularization for adversarial robustness, but the loss is still based on the
construction of explicit adversarial examples.
Regularization of ReLU pre-activations is closely related to efforts to verify or certify the robustness of
neural networks, since reducing the number of effective “branches” in the neighborhoods of inputs can
also reduce the search space of such algorithms. Specifically, Xiao et al. [19] use a similar loss based
on ReLU pre-activations to learn stable ReLUs for efficient verification, but ultimately still rely on a
PGD adversary to generate training perturbations. Similar in spirit is training for efficient certifiable
robustness using interval bound propagation [13, 8], where the interval bound approximations are
tighter when ReLU patterns are more similar. The computational cost is comparable at two forward
passes through the network (versus three for our method), though the adversarial accuracy is worse.
3 Background
ReLU networks Our development focuses on a standard architecture for deep neural networks:
fully-connected feedforward networks with ReLU activations. In general, we can write the function
represented by such a network with n layers and parameters θ = {Ai, bi}i=1,...,n−1 as
z0 = x (1)
zˆi = Ai · zi−1 + bi for i = 1, ..., n− 1 (2)
zi = σ(zˆi) for i = 1, ..., n− 2 (3)
f(x; θ) = zn−1 (4)
where Ai are the weight matrices and bi are the bias vectors. We call the zi “hidden activations”, or
more simply, activations, and the zˆi “pre-activations”.
In this work, we consider ReLU networks, where the non-linear activation function σ(·) in (3) is the
Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU)
zi = σ(zˆi) := max(0, zˆi)
It is clear from this description that ReLU networks are a family of continuous piecewise linear
functions. We denote the linear function induced by an input x as fx(·; θ), i.e., the analytic extension
of the local linear component about x to Rd, where d is the input dimension. This function can also
be obtained by replacing the ReLUs at each layer with the activations “fixed” by x: σi(y;x) :=
σ(zˆi)/zˆi · y.
Adversarial examples One common measure of robustness for neural networks is against a norm-
bounded adversary. In this model, the adversary is given an input budget  over a norm || · ||in, and
asked to produce an output perturbation δ over a norm | · |out. An adversarial example x′ is an -δ
certificate if
||x′ − x||in ≤ 
|f(x′; θ)− f(x; θ)|out ≥ δ
2
When the specific norm is either unimportant or clear from context, we also write the first condition as
x′ ∈ N(x), where N(x) refers to the -ball or neighborhood about x (and similarly for the second
condition). If such a certificate does not exist, we say that the network is -δ robust at x.
In this work, we consider adversaries bounded by the `∞ “norm”, defined for vectors as |x|∞ :=
maxi |xi| (and analogously for matrices). For classification tasks, the adversary is successful if it is
able to produce an example in the -neighborhood of x which causes the network to misclassify. In
this case, we drop δ and simply say that the network is -robust at x. Note that if f(x; θ) is already
incorrect, then x suffices as an adversarial example.
Manifold regularization Manifold regularizers are based on the assumption that the input data
is not drawn uniformly from the input domain X , or the ambient space, but rather supported on
a submanifold M ⊂ X , called the intrinsic geometry. This assumption is natural for, e.g., vision
tasks, where a randomly drawn image is almost certainly noise. There is thus a distinction between
regularizing on the ambient space, where the learned function is smooth with respect to the entire
input domain (e.g., Tikhonov regularization), and regularizing on the intrinsic geometry, which uses
the shape of the input submanifold to determine the regularization norm.
More explicitly, manifold regularization is guided by the intuition that the gradient of the learned
function ∇Mf(x) should be small wherever the marginal probability PX(x) of drawing a sample is
large. This idea leads to the following intrinsic regularizer:
||f ||2I :=
∫
M
||∇Mf(x)||2dPX(x)
In general, the marginalPX(x) is not known, so Belkin et al. [3] propose the following approximation,
which converges to the integral for an unweighted submanifold (i.e., where input samples are
uniformly distributed over the input manifold M ):
||f ||2I ≈
1
N2
N∑
i,j=1
(f(xi)− f(xj))2Wi,j
Here, the x1, ..., xN are samples from the input domain X , and W is the Laplacian matrix of weights
measuring distance between points. A common choice of Laplacian is to use a Gaussian kernel
(Wi,j := N (|xi − xj |, σ2), where N (0, σ2) is a centered normal). To increase the sparsity of the
Laplacian, weights are often truncated to the k-nearest neighbors or neighbors within some -ball.
4 Manifold Regularization for Local Stability
We first reframe the goal of learning functions that are robust using a perspective which decouples
stability from accuracy. The key observation is that we would like to train networks which are
locally stable around natural inputs, even if the network output is incorrect. This approach
contrasts with adversarial training, which attempts to train the network to classify correctly on
worst-case adversarial inputs.
In particular, recall that a network is -robust at x if there does not exist an example in the -
neighborhood of x which causes the network to misclassify. Instead of this definition of robustness,
we consider the related property of -stability:
Definition 4.1 A function f is -stable at an input x if there does not exist a perturbation x′ in the
-neighborhood of x such that f(x) 6= f(x′).
This definition is independent of the correct label for x; as such, we argue that -stability is a
property of the function with respect to the input manifold and can thus be captured using manifold
regularization. For completeness, we state the following connection between robustness and stability:
Proposition 4.1 A function f is -robust at an input x if and only if f is -stable at x and f correctly
classifies x.
Thus our central thesis is that optimizing for stability and accuracy separately will result in a function
which is robust as a byproduct. We note that a similar decomposition between accuracy and stability
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forms the basis for the TRADES algorithm for adversarial robustness [23], though the training
procedure ultimately still relies on adversarial examples generated by PGD to estimate stability.
4.1 Stochastic Manifold Regularization
We first propose a different approximation for general manifold regularization which is specialized for
stochastic gradient descent (SGD). Recall that SGD randomly partitions the dataset into mini-batches
and performs gradient updates with respect to each mini-batch in sequence. The analogous term for
manifold regularization is:
||f ||2I ≈
1
N2b
Nb∑
i,j=1
(f(xi)− f(xj))2Wi,j
where the sum is over the samples in a mini-batch. This procedure has the effect of sparsifying the
Laplacian by randomly sampling graph partitions. The estimate behaves similarly to regular SGD,
i.e., the expectation of this gradient of each mini-batch equals the gradient over the full training set.
The training procedure simply adds this intrinsic regularization term as an additional loss for each
mini-batch gradient update. We call this technique Stochastic Manifold Regularization.
One benefit of this approach is that the regularization comes at nearly zero overhead when training
via stochastic gradient descent. Additionally, the approximation is also an unbiased estimator under
very mild assumptions about the sampling procedure which are inherited from SGD, whereas other
common sparsification techniques, e.g., k-nearest neighbors, require more involved arguments about
concentration. Surprisingly, this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first time manifold regularization
has been combined with SGD this way.
4.1.1 Relationship to Local Stability
We train a network with vanilla stochastic manifold regularizer and experiment between several
settings of the weights Wi,j , namely `2 distance (W−1i,j = ||xi − xj ||22), batch deviation (W−1i,j =
N−1b
∑
j ||xi − xj ||22), and unweighted (Wi,j = 1). Note that we can interpret batch deviation as a
weighted manifold with an unweighted Laplacian, where we approximate the probability density at a
sample x by the average distance to other samples; the regularizer thus prioritizes smoothness where
samples are more “dense” on the manifold.
We find the addition of this loss alone suffices to learn a neural network which is 22% robust on
CIFAR-10 at  = 8/255 against a 200-step PGD adversary with 10 random restarts. This performance
is somewhat surprising, as the approach so far is fully general—i.e., without any reference to the
adversarial budget  or even the structure of the neural network. In other words, the robustness comes
simply from learning functions which are smooth on the intrinsic geometry of input data.
However, -stability clearly modifies the intrinsic geometry by expanding the input submanifold to
its -neighborhood; furthermore, the density of this expanded manifold should be fairly constant in
every -ball, since every point in the -ball is equally “important” for evaluation. We thus design a
second manifold regularization term to capture the geometry of this expanded manifold.
4.2 Hamming Embeddings
One obvious way to extend the previous approach for -stability is to simply replace every input with
a random perturbation from its -ball at training time. However we do not expect this method to yield
good results: the intrinsic geometry is often assumed to be a much lower dimension submanifold,
while the -ball lifts the submanifold back to the full dimension of the ambient space, and thus may
require much higher sample complexity to learn. Indeed, as our experiments show, this approach can
actually hurt the robustness of the network.
Instead, we design a different regularization term which leverages the structure of ReLU networks.
First, observe that every local linear component fx(·; θ) can be identified with a specific “activation
pattern”, i.e., the sequence of branches taken at each ReLU. Because ReLUs separate the input space
via hyperplanes, the activation patterns induce a Hamming metric on the input space. We call the
activation pattern for an input its Hamming embedding, denoted H(·; θ); similarly, we write H(·, ·; θ)
for the induced Hamming metric.
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Figure 1: Surface and contour plots for Hα (α = 1).
Recall that the goal of regularization is to reduce the complexity of the learned function f in
the -neighborhood of inputs x. We argue that the Hamming metric gives a concise measure of
this complexity. Specifically, if we consider the number of distinct local linear components in
the -neighborhood of an input x, then ∀x′ ∈ N(x), H(x, x′; θ) = 0 if and only if the entire
-neighborhood of x is a single linear component. Thus, minimizing the Hamming distance between
x and all x′ ∈ N(x) serves to reduce the number of linear components in the neighborhood of x.
Furthermore, we can view H(·; θ) as an output of the function f , which leads to the following
manifold regularizer:
||H(·; θ)||2I ≈
1
N2
N∑
i=1
H(x+i , x
−
i ; θ)
2Wi+,i−
where the outputs f(x) have been replaced by the Hamming embedding, and x+i and x
+
i are
perturbations from the -neighborhood of xi.
However, this loss term is not continuous in the inputs, and furthermore, the gradients vanish almost
everywhere, so it does not generate good training signals. We thus use a continuous relaxation of the
Hamming distance:
Hα(zˆ, yˆ; θ) := abs(tanh(α ∗ zˆ)− tanh(α ∗ yˆ))
Though this form is not differentiable when zˆ = yˆ, it has the advantage that activation patterns
which are closer to the decision boundaries (i.e., |zˆ| and |yˆ| are small) are penalized more than those
which are farther, an effect which can be tuned by the hyperparameter α. This behavior permits
activations of small magnitude so long as they are precise, the intuition being that the gradient of
Hα approximates the sensitivity of the Hamming distance. Figure 1 presents the surface and contour
plots of Hα.
Additionally, by virtue of the Hamming distance being a metric on the input space, we have that,
given a set of input points X , if maxx,y∈X H(x, y; θ) ≤ c, then the same bound holds for every point
in the convex set of X . Thus, it suffices to sample x′ ∈ N(x) such that the convex set defined by
the x′ covers the -neighborhood of x with high probability. This property motivates sampling x+
to be some corner of the -neighborhood of x, and taking x− = 2x− x+ to be the opposing corner.
We can then also drop the weight Wi+,i− since the distance between x
+
i and x
−
i sampled this way is
constant.
Finally, we note that this idea can be extended more generally to other activation functions by
penalizing differing pre-activations more when the second derivative of the activation function is
large (and so the first-order Taylor approximation has larger errors).
4.2.1 Training with the Hamming Regularizer
For every sample x, we generate a new random maximal perturbation ρ ∈ {±}d and produce the
pair of perturbed inputs x+ := x + p and x− := x − p. We then compute the Hamming distance
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Figure 2: Adversarial accuracy on CIFAR-10 against 20-step PGD with 10 restarts ( = 8 / 255).
between the points x+ and x−. We use the `2 norm to combine the Hamming distances within a
layer and normalize by twice the number of elements in each layer (so that the maximum loss for
a single layer is 1). The resulting losses are summed over every layer and again normalized by the
number of layers. Finally, as with the vanilla manifold regularization, we use stochastic estimates of
the Hamming regularization term to train with SGD.
Our final objective is thus to find the parameters θ which minimize
θ∗ = argmin
θ
1
N
N∑
i=1
V (f(xi; θ), yi) + γK ||f(·, θ)||2K + γI ||f(·, θ)||2I + γH ||H(·, θ)||2I
where V is the loss function for prediction error, ||f(·, θ)||2K is the ambient regularizer (e.g., `2 loss),
and the γK , γI , γH are hyperparameters which control the relative contributions of the different
regularizers.
5 Experimental Results
We trained a PreActResNet18 model [9] for 100 epochs on CIFAR-10 using a combination of vanilla
and Hamming manifold regularization. The final adversarial accuracy of 70.08% ( = 8/255) was
evaluated using a 200-step PGD adversary with 10 random restarts. Figure 2 plots the adversarial
accuracies every 10 epochs against a weaker adversary. All results are reported using the `2 weight
for the standard stochastic manifold regularizer:
||f ||2I ≈
1
N2b
Nb∑
i,j=1
|f(xi)− f(xj)|22
||xi − xj ||22
5.1 Discussion
We compare our performance on CIFAR-10 for  = 8/255 against other proposed defenses with
results taken from the literature. Table 1 reports two performance metrics: robust accuracy is
evaluated using a white-box PGD adversary, which has full access to model parameters to construct
an adversarial perturbation for each input in the test set; and clean accuracy, which is the accuracy on
unperturbed images from the test set.
We find that stochastic manifold regularization achieves not only the best robust accuracy (70.08%
versus the runner-up, vanilla PGD, at 56.8%), but also the best clean accuracy (90.91% versus regular
FGSM, which has 90.3% clean accuracy but 0.0% robust accuracy). These results support the thesis
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Test Accuracy (%)
Mechanism Defense Robust Clean
Adversarial Training
PGD ‡ 45.8 87.3
PGD (early stopping)† 56.8 86.1
FGSM ‡ 0.0 90.3
FGSM (early stopping)† 46.3 86.4
Certification IBP ∗ 34.77 49.49
Adversarial Regularization
TRADES § 56.61 84.92
TRADES (early stopping)† 55.0 84.1
Regularization Manifold Regularization (ours)‡‡ 70.08 90.91
†10-step PGD with no random restarts, reported in Rice et al. [14].
‡20-step PGD with no random restarts, reported in Madry et al. [12].
∗200-step PGD with 10 random restarts, reported in Gowal et al. [8]
§20-step PGD with no random restarts, reported in Zhang et al. [23].
‡‡200-step PGD with 10 random restarts.
Table 1: Comparison of CIFAR-10 adversarial accuracy for  = 8/255.
that fully separating concerns of local stability from accuracy makes it easier to find good solutions
to both problems.
We obtained our results after training for 3 hours on a single GPU, compared to 80 hours for standard
PGD training [15].
5.2 Experimental Methods and Hyperparameters
We use a PreActResNet18 model for the CIFAR-10 experiments. We train using SGD with the cross
entropy loss, momentum of 0.9, and weight decay γK of 1e-4. The learning rate starts at 0.1 and
decreases by a factor of 10 at 25 epochs and additional factors of 100 at 50 and 75 epochs.
We increase epsilon from 2 to 10 over 80 epochs. The weight γI of the manifold regularization term
starts at 10 and increases by 1 every epoch. The weight γH of the Hamming regularization term starts
at 0.1 and increases by 0.01 every epoch, and we set the hyperparameter α = 8. We do not observe
any degradation of performance within the training regime from letting the two manifold regularizers
increase without bound.
For testing, we used a 200-step PGD adversary with 10 random restarts and a PGD step size of 2/255.
We cross-checked our implementation of PGD with the implementation in Engstrom et al. [5].
6 Conclusion
We design two manifold regularizers that together encourage piecewise linear neural networks to
learn locally stable functions. We demonstrate this stability empirically by training models to state-
of-the-art robustness of 70% against an `∞-bounded PGD adversary on CIFAR-10. Interestingly,
our networks also have higher natural accuracy than adversarially trained networks, suggesting that
encouraging the network to be locally stable on the intrinsic geometry of the input submanifold leads
to fundamentally different local optima than using adversarial examples.
Critically, our regularizers rely on random sampling, and thus do not require running an inner
optimization loop to find strong perturbations at training time. As such, our technique exhibits strong
scaling, since it increases batch sizes rather than epochs at training time. Our methods are also
universal, and can be used in any training regime to learn more stable networks. Finally, we believe
that local stability presents a natural objective for learning, and we expect that this line of work will
prove fruitful beyond adversarial robustness.
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